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Abstract: This article analytically excavates youth justice reform (in England and Wales)
by situating it in historical context, critically reviewing the competing rationales that un-
derpin it and exploring the overarching social, economic, and political conditions within
which it is framed. It advances an argument that the foundations of a recognisably mod-
ern youth justice system had been laid by the opening decade of the 20th Century and that
youth justice reform in the post-Second World War period has broadly been structured
over four key phases. The core contention is that historical mapping facilitates an under-
standing of the unreconciled rationales and incoherent nature of youth justice reform to
date, while also providing a speculative sense of future prospects.
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Introduction: Past-Present-Future
More than 50 years ago Hayden White (1966) posed a challenging ques-
tion:
it is worth asking, then, why the past ought to be studied at all and what function can
be served by the contemplation of things under the aspect of history. Put another
way: is there any reason why we ought to study things under the aspect of their
past-ness rather than under the aspect of their present-ness. (p.132)
In reflecting onWhite’s provocation, it is argued here that longitudinal ex-
cavation and analysis of youth justice reform not only enables us to situate
and to understand the present but – if those with power care to take heed
– it might even serve as a basis for crafting policy into the future. In this
way, the argument resonates with an observation made more recently by
the crime historian, Paul Lawrence (2012):
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the current aims of both criminal justice history and sociological criminology – to
understand crime and its control in the past and the present, to contribute to a
better informed and more rational criminal justice policy … are congruent. (p.325)
In other words, the article aims to map youth justice reform in England
and Wales, from the beginning of the 19th Century to the present. It will
be argued that the complex and seemingly incoherent nature of such re-
form ultimately derives from attempts to reconcile and balance competing
rationales and fractious relations within an overarching context of shifting
social, economic, and political conditions. Further – and in the spirit of the
interdisciplinary ‘congruence’ between criminal (youth) justice history and
sociological criminology to which Lawrence refers – the article concludes
by reflecting upon the lessons that historical mapping provides, and the
means by which such insights, alongside the accumulated knowledge base,
might be taken to signpost a more rational (evidence-based) youth justice
for the future.
The Foundations of Modern Youth Justice: Tension, Hybridity, and
Unreconciled Rationales
At the beginning of the 19th Century there was no discrete legal cate-
gory of ‘juvenile delinquent’ or ‘child/young offender’ and the practices
of the criminal justice and penal systems did little, if anything, to discern
between children and adults. The minimum age of criminal responsibil-
ity was set at seven years. As such, once children reached the age of seven
years they were deemed to be fully culpable before the law and exposed
to precisely the same – often Draconian – penalties as adults. As the 19th
Century unfolded, however, social reform and ‘child saving’ initiatives de-
veloped in tandemwith burgeoningmoral anxieties and political concerns.
Prominent philanthropists were moved by their revulsion at the appalling
conditions endured by the children of the poor, while the Establishment
was concerned with the prospect of the ‘criminal classes’ and the ‘danger-
ous classes’ (increasingly organised sections of the working class) joining
forces and destabilising the social order. In short, the prevailing view was
that society needed to protect children but it also needed to be protected
from them; an expression of what might be termed ‘victim-threat dualism’
(Goldson 2004; Hendrick 1994).
Similar concerns inspired the first systematic inquiry into juvenile delin-
quency undertaken by the Committee for Investigating the Alarming In-
crease of Juvenile Delinquency in theMetropolis in 1815. The Committee’s
report was published in 1816 and it concluded:
Dreadful is the situation of the young offender: he [sic] becomes the victim of cir-
cumstances over which he has no control. The laws of his country operate not to
restrain, but to punish, him. (1816 Report cited in Muncie 2015, p.53)
The Committee proposed that distinctive responses should be estab-
lished for ‘juvenile delinquents’, underpinned by reformist and rehabil-
itative objectives as distinct from exclusively retributive and punitive re-
actions. Similarly, in 1817 the Society for the Improvement of Prison
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Discipline and the Reformation of Juvenile Offenders argued that – in or-
der to avoid moral ‘contamination’ – it was increasingly necessary to sepa-
rate the child/young prisoner from his/her more seasoned adult counter-
part. The impetus that such initiatives triggered, gave rise to a substantial
series of reforms that unfolded throughout the 19th Century (for more de-
tailed analyses, see Godfrey et al. 2017; Goldson and Muncie 2009; Hen-
drick 1994; Johnston 2015; King 1998; May 1973; Pinchbeck and Hewitt
1973; Shore 1999).
If juvenile delinquency can be said to have been ‘invented’ in the early
19th Century (Magarey 1978), by the end of the same century a cor-
pus of child-focused legislation, together with a network of child-specific
institutions (primarily Industrial Schools and Reformatory Schools), had
been established and specialist children’s/juvenile courts were also begin-
ning to evolve. In other words, the legal and institutional architecture of
a recognisably modern youth justice system was taking shape and, follow-
ing the election of a reformist Liberal government in 1906 – when chil-
dren’s/juvenile courts were placed on a statutory footing – the administra-
tive separation of the child/youth and adult jurisdictions was more or less
complete. In introducing the Children Bill, the Home Secretary, Herbert
Samuel, proposed that the ‘courts should be agencies for the rescue as well
as the punishment of juveniles’ (cited in Gelsthorpe and Morris 1994, p.950,
italics added). Accordingly, the subsequent Children Act 1908 provided the
new children’s/juvenile courts with both civil jurisdiction over the ‘needy’
child/young person (to ‘save’ or ‘rescue’ the ‘victim’) and criminal jurisdic-
tion over the child/young ‘offender’ (to punish the ‘threat’) meaning that:
… from the outset juvenile justice … [was] riddled with paradox, irony, even con-
tradiction … a function of the child care and criminal justice systems on either side
of it, a meeting place of two otherwise separate worlds. (Harris and Webb 1987,
pp.7–9)
Indeed, the Children Act 1908 might be interpreted as representing the
institutionalisation of a fundamental tension by making ‘the juvenile court
itself a locus for conflict and confusion, a vehicle for the simultaneous wel-
farization of delinquency and the juridicization of need’ (Harris and Webb
1987, p.9). To put it another way, the legislation symbolised a broader
‘penal-welfare complex’ (Garland 1985, p.262) within which policies and
practices could no longer be seen either as singularly humanitarian or as
exclusively repressive. In this way – and from its very inception – the youth
justice system comprised a hybridised formation underpinned by the un-
easy coexistence of otherwise competing (and even contradictory) ratio-
nales that have never since been satisfactorily reconciled.
Within an overarching context in which such hybridity has been, and
remains, an ever-present feature of youth justice, however, historical map-
ping reveals that its precise configuration and the balance that is struck be-
tween competing rationales at any given time, is contingent on, and is typ-
ically shaped by, wider social, economic, and political conditions. In other
words, youth justice is never settled or fixed. Instead, it is a moving im-
age, a dynamic and contingent process that is seemingly characterised by
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incoherence and disconnectedness. Indeed, it is possible to broadly distin-
guish four key phases in the post-Second World War period that, taken
together, epitomise the somewhat floundering nature of reform: (i) the
late 1940s through to the late 1970s when variants of ‘welfarism’ under-
pinned policy and practice; (ii) circa early 1980s to 1992 when ostensibly
progressive ‘justice’ imperatives reached a level of primacy; (iii) the pe-
riod circa 1993 to 2008 when youth justice took a sharply populist and
punitive turn; and (iv) 2009 to the present when political-economic imper-
atives have (rather paradoxically) produced conditions within which the
youth justice system appears to have assumed a more stable and moderate
form.
Four Key Phases in the Further Reform of Youth Justice
The Welfare Phase (circa Late 1940s–Late 1970s)
Following, the SecondWorldWar (1939–45) the inherent tensions between
caring/welfare objectives and controlling/penal priorities resurfaced. The
Labour government, under the leadership of Clement Attlee (1945–51),
engaged with an ambitious and wide-ranging legislative programme that
included a Criminal Justice Bill in 1947. The Bill, and the subsequent
Criminal Justice Act 1948, contained mixed provisions. On the one hand it
placed a number of restrictions on the use of custodial detention for chil-
dren/young people. In this sense, it was consistent with the welfare-based
protectionist reforms that characterised post-war reconstruction and the
development of the welfare state (including, for example, the Family Al-
lowances Act 1945; the National Health Service Act 1946; the National In-
surance Act 1946; the National Assistance Act 1948; and the Children Act
1948). On the other hand, the government bowed to pressure from the
Magistrates’ Association and the same Act provided a new custodial sen-
tence for children/young people whose behaviour was thought to be too
challenging for the approved schools. It follows that the detention centre
order was designed to deliver a short but rigorous custodial experience to
‘the type of offender’ – to borrow the words of the then Home Secretary,
Chuter Ede – ‘to whom it is necessary to give a short but sharp reminder
that he [sic] is getting into ways that will inevitably lead him into disaster’
(cited in Newburn 1995, p.132).
The political context within which youth justice was framed was further
complicated by the competing interests of various professional constituen-
cies that were consolidating under the broader aegis of the developing
welfare state. Social workers, probation officers, psychologists, teachers,
police officers, magistrates, prison officers, and various residential in-
stitutions each competed for power and influence. Similarly, academic
experts from the expanding disciplines of psychology, sociology, social ad-
ministration/policy, and criminology, tussled both within their disciplines,
and between them, in the course of debating their various aetiological
accounts of youth crime and proffering their respective policy prescrip-
tions in respect of youth justice. In this way, the contested nature of youth
justice reform was compounded by the ‘professionalisation’ of the welfare
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state, within which the burgeoning ‘welfare’ and ‘justice’ bureaucracies
lobbied to protect their interests, expand their authority, and extend their
influence.
By the mid- to late-1950s the Home Office was being pressed both by
liberal child welfare experts (increasingly concerned with the claimed rela-
tion between family breakdown and youth crime), and by the Magistrates’
Association (whose interests primarily rested with the role of the courts
in balancing ‘welfare’ and ‘justice’), to undertake a review of youth jus-
tice policy. Accordingly, in 1956 the Home Office, under the instructions
of the Conservative government (1951–64), established a departmental
committee (the Ingleby Committee) to undertake such a review and the
Ingleby Report was published in 1960. The Report disappointed many
who had anticipated more radical proposals to ‘decriminalise’ elements of
the youth justice process and to establish, instead, a more unified family-
(and welfare-)oriented service. Meanwhile, and prior to forming a govern-
ment following the general election in 1964 – after which it would remain
in power until 1970 – the Labour Party had established a ‘study group’
which prepared its own report entitled Crime: A Challenge to Us All, other-
wise known as the Longford Report (named after its chair, Lord Long-
ford). The observations and recommendations of the Longford Report
went substantially further than those of the Ingleby Committee; propos-
ing that child/young ‘offenders’ should be removed from the jurisdiction
of the criminal courts altogether as offending manifested ‘the child’s need
for skilled help and guidance’ (Labour Party 1964, p.28).
Shortly after assuming power, the Labour government issued a White
Paper in 1965, The Child, the Family and the Young Offender (Home Office
1965). The paper carried many of the recommendations contained within
the Longford Report and proposed to abolish the juvenile court and to
replace it with a non-judicial ‘family council’, that would be an integral ele-
ment of a unified ‘family service’. Inevitably, such radical proposals sparked
inter-agency/inter-professional power struggles. In particular, magistrates,
legal professionals and the police objected to what they believed to signal a
significant diminution of their power and influence and made strong rep-
resentations to government. No doubt mindful of its small parliamentary
majority, the Labour administration compromised and the 1968 White Pa-
per, Children in Trouble (HomeOffice 1968), diluted key elements of the ear-
lier proposals – without totally dispensing with their underpinning prin-
ciples – and, in so doing, it managed to draw the competing political, ad-
ministrative, and professional constituencies into a manageable consensus.
The juvenile court survived (the ‘justice’ constituency), but the power and
influence of the social work bureaucracy (the ‘welfare’ constituency) was
substantially extended. This settlement found legislative embodiment in
the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 and led academic commenta-
tors to claim that:
… the late 1960s … have been seen as the high-water mark of reform in the field of
juvenile delinquency … the triumph of ‘welfare’ as the dominant ideology. (Blagg
and Smith 1989, p.99)
321
C© 2020 The Authors. The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice published by Howard
League and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The Howard Journal Vol 59 No 3. September 2020
ISSN 2059-1098, pp. 317–334
Indeed, the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 is widely regarded as
the most welfare-oriented legislation ever enacted with regard to the treat-
ment of child/young offenders in England and Wales (Bottoms 2008). As
with many acts of parliament, however, it contained a provision stating that
its various sections would only come into force when so ordered by the rel-
evant Secretary of State and, for a variety of reasons – not least ongoing
political and professional contestation and the return of a Conservative
government in 1970 – some key elements of the Act were never imple-
mented (Bottoms, McClean and Patchett 1970). The partial implementa-
tion of the legislation meant that far from supplanting the more retribu-
tive elements of the youth justice system (including borstals, some juvenile
courts, and detention centres), the new welfare-oriented provisions were,
in reality, simply incorporated and grafted on:
If one compares the sections of the Act that were implemented and those that were
not … a new system came in but the old one did not go out … the two systems came
to some form of accommodation … the old system simply expanded in order to
make room for the newcomer … the two systems have, in effect, become vertically
integrated, and an additional population of customer-clients has been identified
in order to ensure that they both have plenty of work to do. (Thorpe et al. 1980,
pp.22–3)
In other words, the welfare emphasis served, in practice, to extend the
reach of the youth justice system. Well meaning, but too often over-zealous
social work intervention, engaged children in ‘treatment programmes’ in
the belief that they would offset the likelihood of further delinquency. In
instances when such approaches failed to prevent offending – as was fre-
quently the case – children were ultimately exposed to more traditional re-
tributive disposals. The result produced a ‘widening of the net’, a ‘blurring
of boundaries’ and a ‘diversification of penality’ (Harris and Webb 1987,
161–6) and, throughout the 1970s, there was a substantial increase of chil-
dren removed from their families and communities and placed either in
residential care or custodial detention (Thorpe et al. 1980).
The Justice Phase (circa Early 1980s–1992)
By the end of the 1970s the concepts of ‘welfare’ and ‘treatment’ in re-
spect of youth justice had become almost synonymous with excessive inter-
vention. Moreover, the election of a Conservative government in 1979 un-
der the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, generated additional concerns.
Newburn (1997, p.42) describes the 1979 Conservative manifesto as ‘the
most avowedly “law and order” manifesto in British political history’: it
‘promised, among many other measures, to strengthen sentencing powers
with respect to juveniles’. Paradoxically, it was against this antagonistic po-
litical backdrop that support developed for an approach – underpinned by
the intersecting principles of ‘diversion’, ‘decriminalisation’ and ‘decarcer-
ation’ – that ultimately represented what Rutherford (1995) described as
‘one of the most remarkably progressive periods of juvenile justice policy’
(p.57).
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Support for the new ‘justice’-based approach was facilitated curiously by
prevailing economic conditions and political priorities and was rooted in
an unlikely coalescence of four otherwise disparate sets of interests: first, el-
ements of academic research; second, professional practice developments
within youth justice (informed by the lessons of the 1970s); third, specific
policy objectives of Thatcherite Conservatism; and fourth, the stated im-
peratives of the police and the courts to reduce the incidence of youth
crime. Each of these interests combined to form a delicately balanced con-
sensus that served to guide youth justice reform through the decade of the
1980s and into the 1990s.
Academic research provided a consistent stream of evidence demon-
strating that most youth offending was petty, opportunistic, and transitory
and that the majority of children ‘grow out of it’ (Rutherford 1992). Simi-
larly, the academics – no doubt informed by earlier ‘Chicago School’ soci-
ology (see, for example, Becker 1963; Blumer 1969; Kitsuse 1962; Lemert
1967; Matza 1969; Schur 1973) – argued persuasively that premature and
over-zealous youth justice intervention not only hampered the process of
growing out of crime but – by the formal application of criminal ‘labels’ –
it also served to stigmatise children/young people, trigger negative social
reactions to them and, in so doing, compound the likelihood of further
offending/criminalisation. Such evidence chimed with the experiences of
youth justice practitioners who embraced it enthusiastically and, further,
applied it by way of ‘decriminalising’ children’s/young people’s relatively
‘normal’ deviant behaviour and diverting them from the formal youth jus-
tice apparatus (Smith 2017). Equally, academic research also confirmed
that institutional and/or custodial responses to children and young peo-
ple were often damaging, expensive, and counterproductive. Practitioners
seized upon this, too, and developed imaginative community-based ‘alter-
natives’ to residential care and penal custody.
The symbiosis of research and practice at this time flourished within the
spaces provided by its paradoxical compatibility with specific policy prior-
ities of Thatcherite Conservatism. Indeed, throughout the 1980s the Con-
servative Party was committed to ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’
and relieving the Treasury of some of its more onerous public expendi-
ture commitments. Diverting petty child/young offenders from the formal
youth justice process and supervising more serious child/young offenders
within their working-class communities – at a fraction of what it would
cost to send them to court and custody respectively – carried obvious fis-
cal appeal. As Pratt (1987) observed: ‘to reduce the custodial population
on the grounds of cost effectiveness … led to general support for alter-
natives to custody initiatives’ (p.429). Moreover, Conservative government
ministers throughout this period turned to academic evidence to legitimise
approaches to youth justice that offered both economy and efficiency:
I think there is now a fairly wide consensus about what the response to juvenile
offending should be… formal intervention should be kept to aminimum, consistent
with the circumstances and seriousness of each case. (John Patten, Conservative
Minister 1988, cited in Goldson 1997, p.126)
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If anything, I have become firmer in my belief that penal custody remains a pro-
foundly unsatisfactory outcome for children. (Virginia Bottomley, Conservative
Minister 1988, cited in Goldson 1997, p.126)
Two major Home Office circulars promoted police cautions and the use
of informal warnings as diversionary strategies to reduce the numbers of
children/young people being prosecuted and processed through the courts
(Home Office 1985, 1990). The circulars were accompanied by the succes-
sive introduction of new legislation – most notably the Criminal Justice Act
1982, the Criminal Justice Act 1988, and the Criminal Justice Act 1991 –
that incrementally restricted the courts’ powers to commit children/young
people to penal detention. Taken together, the circulars and the legislation
produced substantial diversionary and decarcerative effects: by 1990, 70%
of boys and 86% of girls aged between 14 and 16 years who offended were
cautioned by the police (Home Office 1991); the number of children pro-
ceeded against in the courts halved between 1984 and 1992 (Home Office
1993, p.126); and the total number of custodial sentences for children (is-
sued over a year) fell from 7,900 in 1981 to 1,700 in 1990 and reached
a low of 1,304 in 1993 (Home Office 1991). Moreover, the approach was
found to be effective and the Children’s Society Advisory Committee on
Juvenile Custody and its Alternatives (1993) reported that:
Home Office statistics suggest that there has been a 37% decline in the number
of known juvenile offenders since 1985. This is partly attributable to demographic
changes – the juvenile population has fallen by 25%.However, the number of known
juvenile offenders per 100,000 of the population has also fallen, from 3,130 in 1980
to 2,616 in 1990, a drop of 16%. It remains true that juveniles commit a high pro-
portion of all detected offences but this also appears to be declining. In 1980 juvenile
crime represented 32% of all crime; in 1991 that figure has dropped to 20%. (p.21)
Notwithstanding the success of the reforms – which effectively served to
pacify any lingering concerns that might have been held by the police and
the courts regarding the imperatives of youth crime prevention/reduction
– by 1993 the policies and practices of diversion and decarceration were
about to be abandoned as youth justice entered a highly-politicised and
distinctively populist and punitive phase.
The Punitive Phase (circa 1993–2008)
By the early part of the 1990s, changing social, economic, and political
conditions, together with an extraordinary event, conjoined to produce a
backlash to the youth justice reforms that had been introduced throughout
the previous decade. Between 1989 and 1992, a major recession impacted
theUK economy and the opinion polls appeared to signal that public confi-
dence in the Conservative Party – that had been in government since 1979
– was waning. With a general election pending, leading figures in the Con-
servative Party became conscious of the need to take remedial action. Re-
discovering the Party’s traditional ‘hard-line’ on law and order comprised
a key plank of the recovery strategy. In his ‘Foreword’ to the Party’s gen-
eral election manifesto in 1992, John Major – who had replaced Margaret
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Thatcher as Prime Minister and Party Leader – expressed a commitment
to ‘protect law-abiding people from crime and disorder’ and, under a sub-
heading ‘Freedom Under Law’, the manifesto drew particular attention to
child/young offenders:
The Conservative Party has always stood for the protection of the citizen and the
defence of the rule of law … Two-thirds of the offences dealt with by our courts are
committed by only seven per cent of those convicted. Most of these constant offenders
started down the path of crime while still of school age. (Conservative Party 1992, no page
number, italics added)
Furthermore, shortly following the 1992 general election (that returned
the Conservative Party to government) an extraordinary event served to
cement the punitive phase in youth justice reform. In February 1993, the
murder of a two-year-old child, James Bulger, and the subsequent convic-
tion of two ten-year-old children, was portrayed widely as the ultimate ex-
pression of child/youth lawlessness. Within days of the toddler’s death, the
PrimeMinister, JohnMajor, proclaimed that the time had arrived for ‘soci-
ety to condemn a little more and understand a little less’ (cited in Goldson
1997, p.130). Three months later, Michael Howard, the new Home Secre-
tary, referred to ‘a self-centred arrogant group of young hoodlums … who
are adult in everything accept years’ and who ‘will no longer be able to use
age as an excuse for immunity from effective punishment … they will find
themelves behind bars’ (cited in Goldson 1997, p.130). Meanwhile, the fail-
ure of the opposition Labour Party to seize power from the Conservatives
in the 1992 general election provided succour for a radical policy ‘rebrand-
ing’. What was to become ‘New Labour’ broke away from the Labour Party
tradition of moderate penal policy and, in 1993, Tony Blair – opposition
Home Secretary at the time – declared an intention to be ‘tough on crime,
tough on the causes of crime’. The effect of such developments shaped
the approaches to youth justice reform that were subsequently adopted by
each of the main political parties.
The Conservative government introduced two acts of parliament that
served to dramatically reverse its earlier policies of diversion and decarcer-
ation. The Criminal Justice Act 1993 had particularly unfavourable impli-
cations for youth justice (Rutherford 1995). Moreover, the specific sections
of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 that related to youth jus-
tice included the introduction of new, privately managed, secure training
centres for the imprisonment of children aged 12–14 years (which reversed
a trend in youth justice policy dating back to the Children Act 1908) and,
for 15- to 17-year-olds, the doubling of themaximum sentence of detention
in young offender institutions.
Similarly, from circa 1992 the Labour opposition – steadily transmogri-
fying intoNew Labour – published a wide range of youth justice policy doc-
uments within which a creeping punitivity was increasingly evident (Gold-
son 2010; Jones 2002). It was not until the election of the first New Labour
government in May 1997, however, that the full weight of its ‘tough-
ness’ agenda was practically realised. Within months of coming to office,
the government issued several major policy statements relating to youth
325
C© 2020 The Authors. The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice published by Howard
League and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The Howard Journal Vol 59 No 3. September 2020
ISSN 2059-1098, pp. 317–334
justice (HomeOffice 1997a, 1997b, 1997c), followed by aWhite Paper omi-
nously entitled No More Excuses: A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime in
England andWales (HomeOffice 1997d). Unprecedented and seemingly re-
lentless legislative activity followed over the next decade and, accompanied
by a ‘blizzard of initiatives, crackdowns and targets’ (Neather 2004, p.11),
it characterised an exceptionally punitive period in the history of youth
justice reform (Goldson 2010). By way of illustration, at the ‘shallow end’
a staggering 187,000+ children/young people entered the youth justice
system – first time entrants – during the two-year period 2006/7–2007/8
(Youth Justice Board 2007, 2008). At the ‘deep end’ of the same system
the trends specific to child/youth imprisonment followed similar upward
trajectories. In the ten-year period 1992–2001 inclusive, the total annual
number of custodial sentences imposed upon children/young people rose
from approximately 4,000 to 7,600, a 90% increase (Nacro 2003, 2005).
While such trends commenced prior to the election of the first New Labour
government in 1997, they simply continued afterwards (Hagell 2005). The
average ‘juvenile secure estate’ daily population for the year 2000/1, for ex-
ample, was 2,807 and, by 2007/8, it had risen to 2,932 (Youth Justice Board
2014).
The Pragmatic Phase (circa 2009–Present)
Following approximately 15 years of cross-party punitivity (circa 1993–
2008) it seemed that amood of ‘institutionalised intolerance’ (Muncie 1999)
– most conspicuously expressed by historically high rates of child/youth
criminalisation at the ‘shallow end’ and child/youth imprisonment at the
‘deep end’ – had become entrenched features of the youth justice pol-
icy landscape. But, from 2009, the punitive emphasis was quite dramati-
cally ramped down. As Sutherland et al. (2017, p.1) reported, for example:
‘the number of youth first time entrants (FTEs) [had] peaked in 2006/7 at
110,784’. But by 2014/15, ‘there were 20,544 FTEs – around 80% fewer
compared to the peak’. Similarly, in the period 2000–8, the daily average
number of child/young prisoners fluctuated between a low of 2,745 and a
high of 3,029 (Bateman 2012, p.37) but, three years later the daily number
of child/young prisoners had fallen ‘by a third … from about 3,000 in the
first half of 2008 to around 2,000 in the first half of 2011’ (Allen 2011, p.3).
Soon after, the Chief Inspector of Prisons (in post at the time) observed
that the child/youth prison population fell ‘by almost 30 per cent … from
1,873 to 1,320 … between February 2012 and February 2013’ (Hardwick
2014, p.22). Moreover, by April 2014 the number of child/young prison-
ers had dropped further still to 1,177 (Ministry of Justice 2014), and the
downward trend continued. In the year ending March 2019, for example:
‘there was an average of just under 860 children in custody at any one time
during the year … this [represents] a fall of 70% compared with ten years
ago [and] a 4% fall compared with the previous year’(Youth Justice Board
and Ministry of Justice 2020, p.37). But how do we account for this?
In recent times, the substantial diminution of the numbers of children
and young people being criminalised (FTEs) and being imprisoned – at
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the respective ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ ends of the youth justice system – sim-
ply cannot be accounted for by any singular reference to the volume or
nature of youth crime over the same period (Allen 2011; Bateman 2012,
2015). It is equally implausible to suggest that either ‘practitioner activism’,
of which there are ‘few signs’ (Bateman 2012, p.39), or any deliberative
actions taken by the Youth Justice Board have imposed any determina-
tive bearing on such trends. Indeed, Allen (2011, p.9), points to the para-
dox that when ‘reducing the use of custody was one of the Youth Justice
Board’s corporate targets from 2005–8’ there was actually ‘no decline in
numbers’, but after ‘the target was dropped in the corporate plan for the
following three-year period (2008–11)’ the size of the child prisoner pop-
ulation began to shrink quite significantly. In other words, the irony lies
in the fact that the number of child/young prisoners began to fall at pre-
cisely the same time that the Board withdrew its explicit and publicly-stated
commitment to penal reduction. Furthermore, despite the best efforts of
academic researchers, non-governmental organisations, and authoritative
human rights agencies, to influence government policy in the direction of
penal reduction (by appealing to research evidence and international hu-
man rights standards), there are few, if any, grounds to suggest that the
combined effect of such interventions have, in and of themselves, realised
significant purchase.
Rather, just as Pratt (1987, p.429) had argued that ‘cost effectiveness’
was a key driver during the period of penal reduction circa early 1980s–
1992, Faulkner (2011, p.80) detected that the ‘crisis in public debt’ – that
emerged some 20 years later – provided ‘opportunity for progress in pe-
nal practice’. Indeed, the global financial crisis of 2008 and the severe con-
ditions of austerity that followed, triggered a discernible shift in political
mood with regard to youth justice reform, not least because ‘authoritari-
anism is very costly’ (Sanders 2011, p.15), and shrinking the overall popu-
lation of children and young people across the youth justice system – from
its ‘shallow’ to its ‘deep’ ends – returns major financial savings. In the im-
mediate post-financial crisis period (between February 2008 and August
2010), for example, the Youth Justice Board ‘decommissioned 710 places’
from within the ‘juvenile secure estate’ producing ‘estimated savings of
£30 million per year’ (House of Commons Justice Committee 2013, p.38).
More broadly, conditions of austerity combined with system reconfigura-
tion, have imposed major downscaling effects on the youth justice system
from the top down. The Youth Justice Board itself has become a ‘leaner or-
ganisation’ amounting to ‘half the size it was before’ (Youth Justice Board
2019, p.5), ‘cost-cutting measures [have] resulted in half of all magistrates
courts closing between 2010 and 2018’ (Pidd 2019a, no page number) and
‘there has been a 75% drop in children going through the criminal justice
system’ (Pidd 2019a, no page number). Whatever other influences are at
play, therefore, it is the pragmatic economic imperatives of cost reduction
that ultimately provide the key for comprehending the nature of youth
justice reform in the most recent period.
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Returning to Past-Present-Future: Lessons and Speculative Prospects
Reflecting upon Past-ness: The Lessons of History
Ultimately, the youth justice system in England and Wales – as elsewhere –
comprises a State apparatus that is designed to govern and regulate struc-
turally disadvantaged children even if, over time, it has been (and remains)
underpinned by hybridised – and sometimes contradictory – rationales.
The analytical excavation and historical mapping of youth justice reform
– from the origins of a discerningly modern youth justice system in the
19th and early 20th Centuries, through its four post-Second World War
phases – reveals that the intrinsic tensions and contested logics that under-
pinmodern youth justice have never been satisfactorily reconciled. Indeed,
youth justice reform has floundered and continues to flounder, framed
by contingent conditions and ever-changing social, economic, and political
imperatives.
If – in the first half of the 19th Century – the appalling conditions that
confronted ‘juvenile delinquents’ gave rise to caring/welfare objectives, the
fears and anxieties that the same children induced simultaneously nour-
ished controlling/penal priorities. As noted, by the opening decades of the
20th Century the legal foundations and system architecture of youth justice
effectively comprised a ‘meeting place of two otherwise separate worlds’.
The potential of post-SecondWorld War reconstruction, major investment
in public services and the establishment of the welfare state to drive reform
and to radically refashion a progressive youth justice system, was diluted
by inter-professional power brokering and political compromise. Instead,
the vertical integration of social work/welfare and criminal/youth justice
(‘two otherwise separate worlds’) gave rise to diversified forms of interven-
tion, increasingly dispersed technologies of control, and substantial net-
widening. Quite different political-economic objectives – shaped largely by
the imperatives of financial restraint – significantly moderated the reach
and depth of youth justice intervention in the 1980s and early 1990s and
have produced similar downscaling in the post-2008 period, even if ‘rolling
back the frontiers of the state’ (in the former phase) and severe conditions
of austerity (in the more recent period), each imposed catastrophic con-
sequences for the poorest and most disadvantaged children and young
people. And, of course, the intervening years, circa 1993–2008, were char-
acterised by cynical cross-party populism within which crime – and in par-
ticular youth crime – was deliberately politicised for electoral effect, succes-
sive governments promised ever-tougher policies and youth justice system
expansion reached levels tantamount to penal obesity.
Set against a backdrop of floundering incoherence, therefore, perhaps
the key lesson that analytical excavation and historical mapping teaches is
that accumulated knowledge – be it obtained through academic research or
professional practice experience – has, to date, exercised, at best, secondary
influence over processes of youth justice reform. Or, to put it another way,
evidence-based approaches have never been truly realised and, to borrow
and reapply David Garland’s (2001) observation, youth justice reform is:
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… very much a political process. It is governed not by any criminological logic but
instead by … political actors and the exigencies, political calculations and short-
term interests that provide their motivations. In its detailed configuration, with all
its incoherence and contradictions, [it] is thus a product of the decidedly aleatory
history of political manoeuvres and calculations. (p.191, italics in original)
Surveying Present-ness: The Contemporary Youth Justice Field
Contemporary youth justice discourse is increasingly preoccupied with se-
rious youth crime and, more especially, heavy-end violence in which chil-
dren and young people are both ‘victims’ and ‘threats’ (often at one and
the same time). In considering what it terms ‘the rise in serious youth vio-
lence in recent years’, for example, the House of Commons Home Affairs
Committee (2019) has observed that:
Police-recorded homicides have increased by over a third in the last five years, and
knife offences have risen by over 70%. The number of under-18s admitted to hospi-
tal with knife injuries also rose by a third between 2013–14 and 2017–18. A growing
number of young males, in particular, are being murdered on our streets. Our in-
quiry has found that recent rises in serious youth violence are a social emergency,
which must be addressed through much more concerted Government action at a
national and local level. (p.3)
The vexed issue of ‘county-lines’ – and the concomitant recruitment of
children and young people into sophisticated crime networks and gangs –
runs alongside and intersects with concerns about serious youth violence.
In this way, the Children’s Commissioner for England (2019) has reported:
The criminal gangs operating in England are complex and ruthless organisations,
which use sophisticated techniques to groom children and chilling levels of violence
to keep them compliant … British Crime Survey data held by the Office of National
Statistics suggests that there are 27,000 children in England who identify as a gang
member. (p.6)
It is clearly important to situate contemporary youth violence and ‘gang’
activity within historical context and to guard against ahistorical ‘moral
panic’ (Goldson 2011). That said, the weight of authoritative evidence im-
plies that it is also necessary to take such concerns seriously, to subject the
phenomena to rigorous analysis and to consider the issues that it (might)
raise for future youth justice reform. But, as ever, the field is contested,
and burgeoning policy proposals are pointing in different directions.
On one hand, there are signs that populist logics are resurfacing and
contemporary youth justice discourse in particular, and criminal justice
discourse more broadly, is seemingly on the cusp of being repoliticised.
At the time of writing, the government’s most recent spending plans (for
2020–1) refer to substantial investment in policing and imprisonment: ‘…
an extra £750 million for policing … to recruit 20,000 additional officers
… [and] delivery of the government’s £2.5 billion commitment to create
an additional 10,000 prison places’ (HM Treasury 2019, p.3). Such policy
‘mood music’ echoes the politicisation and populist punitivism that drove
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youth justice reform in the period circa 1993–2008 and that gave rise to
significant penal expansion.
On the other hand, other veritable sources continue to draw attention
to the well-established failings of such responses and to advocate alterna-
tive approaches. Some of the most up-to-date research, for example, has
indicated that 71.5% of children and young people sentenced to custodial
detention ‘went on to reoffend within a year’ (Pidd 2019b, no page num-
ber) and the current HM Chief Inspector of Prisons (2019) recently wrote
to the relevant government minister: ‘expressing my concerns that … HM
Inspectorate of Prisons could not classify any STC or YOI as safe enough
to hold children’ (p.6). It follows that the United Nations Global Study on
Children Deprived of Liberty – the most comprehensive study of its type
ever undertaken in the world – has urged Nation States to: ‘develop and
implement a national strategy aimed at replacing the detention of children
in penal facilities with non-custodial solutions based upon broad consulta-
tion with experts, civil society and children themselves’ (United Nations
2019, p.336).
So, in the face of pressing concerns about serious youth crime and, par-
ticularly violence, policy proposals are fundamentally divided, and the fu-
ture shape and direction of youth justice reform over its next phase is un-
certain.
Looking to the Future: Speculative Prospects
The historiography of reform, the hybridised and unreconciled essence
of youth justice and the floundering and incoherent nature of policy for-
mation serves to remind us, should we need reminding, that ‘reading
the present’, let alone ‘mapping the future’, is ‘complex and challenging’
(Goldson 2019). Past-ness exposes the ‘aleatory history of political manoeu-
vres and calculations’ to which Garland refers. Present-ness evokes press-
ing concerns about children being drawn into serious crime and violence,
an abiding sense of exclusion andmarginalisation for identifiable groups of
young people and a range of uncertainties regarding the manner in which
the recently (December 2019) elected Conservative government might
respond.
In light of such instability and uncertainty, the knowledge base that has
developed over more than two centuries offers key insights that might
be taken to guide future youth justice reform. The ‘iatrogenic’ effects of
over-zealous youth justice interventions are increasingly recognised (Gatti,
Tremblay and Vitaro 2009; Smith 2017), and McAra and McVie (2019)
have noted that: ‘intensive forms of intervention are likely to be damag-
ing, inhibiting the normal processes of desistance from offending’ (p.75).
Where youth justice intervention is deemed unavoidable, facilitating re-
sponsive and respectful community supervision for young people is criti-
cally important. Maruna and Mann (2019), for example, note that ‘recog-
nition of their worth from others, feelings of hope and self-efficacy and a
sense of meaning and purpose in their lives’ (p.7) are imperative if chil-
dren/young people are to desist from offending. Perhaps the most vital
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insight of all is the need to avoid unnecessary penal detention. The inter-
national evidence is absolutely compelling in exposing the persistent fail-
ings of penal institutions; imprisonment typically comprises a profoundly
harmful, spectacularly ineffective and exceptionally expensive response to
children and young people in trouble (Goldson 2015).
So, to recall and respond to the question posed by Hayden White. The
reasons for analytically excavating youth justice reform under the aspect
of its past-ness are at least twofold. First, historical mapping helps us to
comprehend the otherwise incomprehensible, floundering, and incoher-
ent trajectory of policy formation. Second, as Paul Lawrence observes,
similar excavation and the linking of past and present facilitates – at least
potentially – a better informed approach to youth justice reform in the fu-
ture. But the practical realisation of such potential will ultimately require
a break with past practices; a departure from the ‘political calculations and
short-term interests’ to which David Garland refers. Such prospects are
necessarily speculative, however, and it remains to be seen precisely what
direction youth justice reform will follow into the future.
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